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Constructing the New Nepal: Religious Billboards in
Nepal’s Second People’s Movement

Michael Baltutis

Accompanying King Gyanendra’s February First,
2005, efforts to consolidate his loosening grip
on national power, the royal Nepali government
raised a series of highly visible billboards
throughout the cities of the Kathmandu Valley.
A small subset of these boards were explicitly
religious, encouraging Nepal’s citizens to
perform their patriotic bhakti (devotion), karma
(action), and dharma (duty). This rhetorical
support of a ‘universal’ Hinduism contradicted
the inclusivism that was widely regarded as
part and parcel of the ‘new Nepal’ and resulted
in a contradictory vision of the same: a modern
secular nation composed of citizens, rather
than of subservient subjects, unified by and
working together with a Hindu monarch for the
betterment of the nation.
This conflict contributed to the widespread
skepticism with which these signs were met,
indicated by the multiple acts of graffiti,
vandalism, and outright destruction brought
against them, and by their removal by the
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royal government fifteen months later. This
paper will detail the form and content of these
religious billboards and argue that this religious
language was one of the reasons behind their
failure to deliver a message amenable to the
middle class citizens of Kathmandu, as diverse
parties throughout contemporary Nepal
worked to define the multivalent ‘new Nepal.’
Keywords: Nepal, politics, religion, media, royalty.

Introduction
“It is our faith that we will all join together for the
construction of a strong and successful new Nepal
that is firmly committed to constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy.”
saṁvaidhānik rājtantra ra bahudalīya prajātantra
jagmā adiera sabal ra samunnata nava nepāl nirmāṇ
mā hāmī sabai juṭnu pardcha bhanne hāmro viśvās
cha
– Billboard on Kathmandu’s Kanthipath Road, attributed to Śrī 5 Gyānendra
The multivalent term ‘new Nepal’ (N. nayā Nepāl) used in
the billboard quoted above has become the watchword
of parties in many quarters of Nepali society to name the
social, developmental, and political processes currently
at work in post-monarchical Nepal.1 Due to the official
processes of bringing to an end the Nepali monarchy in
2006-2008 and the absence of a constitution since 2006,
many citizens anticipate this desired ‘new Nepal’ while
transitioning from an implied ‘old Nepal,’ a nation that was
ruled by an active monarchy and racked by a decade-long
civil war with Maoist rebels. The issues at stake in the new
Nepal are generally those that had been rejected in the forty-point demand that the Maoist party had attempted to
negotiate in 1996: nationality, democracy, and livelihood
(Hutt 2004: 5, 285-287). Similarly, scholarship on the new
Nepal, in positing and predicting the nation’s trajectory,
builds off of these same concerns, taking up such additional issues as freedom of the press (Hutt 2006), the political
power of indigenous groups (Hangen 2007), the role of
informal institutions in the political exclusion of marginalized groups (Lawoti 2008), the sociology of the conflict
itself (Lawoti and Pahari 2010), and the 1990 Constitution
that reinforced the institutional problems to which Maoist
rebels and social and ethnic activists responded (Malagodi
2013).
Much of this scholarship specifically utilizes the term ‘new
Nepal’ as it accounts for, projects, and occasionally prescribes the characteristics of the democratizing nation and
largely focuses on the concept of inclusion (N. samābeśi)
that counters the “monolithic” Nepal whose constitution
“had been blamed for institutionalizing, legitimizing, and
engendering patterns of exclusion and discrimination”
(Malagodi 2013: 3).2 In his 2010 book New Nepal: The Fault
Lines, strategic analyst Nishchal Pandey describes the
new Nepal as an “inclusive and democratic” nation that
includes “the concept of federalism based on ethnicity”
(Pandey 2010: 38, 44). The new Nepal, Pandey writes,
represents a “‘positive transformation’ of the state from

a centralized, unitary, feudal rule of only a certain privileged section of the society to an inclusive, federal and a
truly democratic republic…” (Pandey 2010: 2). Similarly,
journalist Rita Manchanda emphasizes the shift in national conflict from one between monarchy and democratic
forces to one dealing with ethnic and regional issues where
inclusion becomes key (Manchanda 2006: 5035; Manchanda
2008; Snellinger 2009). In separate articles on the education and performance of Maoist rebels and organizations,
Kristine Eck (2010: 44) and Amanda Snellinger (2010: 80)
see a welcoming of traditionally excluded groups and
individuals as one of the primary features of the new Nepal
desired by opponents of the Nepali monarchy. Despite the
high degree of consistency among these applications of the
term, Mahendra Lawoti and Anup Pahari warn that it functions as little more than a metaphor that entails “no more
than a skeletal consensus on what a ‘New Nepal’ means in
practical terms, or how to get there” (Lawoti and Pahari
2010: 319). The new Nepal, then, represents the process of
constructing a nation along more openly democratic lines
more than it represents any single static moment in time.
Before its dissolution, Nepal’s royal government communicated its own vision of the new Nepal through its installation of 149 billboards displayed throughout the cities of
the Kathmandu Valley. The Department of Information
installed these boards immediately following the State of
Emergency that King Gyanendra declared on 1 February
2005; citing the 1990 Constitution, Gyanendra assumed
absolute power of the country and suspended freedoms of
speech and assembly in a bid to end the decade-long civil
war with the Maoist rebels and to bring together the seven
main democratic parties. These billboards thus constituted
one piece in Gyanendra’s attempt to consolidate state power in the palace by communicating his vision of the new
Nepal, a vision outlined in his February First proclamation
that provided the original source for many of the messages
inscribed on these boards (Government of Nepal 2005).
Though the messages outlined on these boards touched on
the most pressing and publicly discussed issues of the day,
namely those contained in the Maoists’ forty-point demand, a small number contained explicitly Hindu religious
language: bhakti, karma, and dharma (devotion, action, and
duty). The Hindu rhetoric contained in these boards does
not represent the religion actually practiced throughout
Nepal, but rather prescribes a suitable religio-political ideology for Kathmandu’s developing middle class at a time
of crisis for the Nepali monarchy. In analyzing the installation, socio-political role, and materiality of these royal billboards, I am considering them as a part of the Nepali ijjat
economy. Mark Liechty describes this as a moral-material
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economy whose “regimen of orthodox practices … marks
out a new middle space between tradition and modernity”
(Liechty 2003: 84). Dealing more specifically with religion, I
also have in mind the “middle class religiosity” that Robert
Orsi refers to in his work on Catholic practices in major
American cities, with its “[s]anitized, carefully bounded
and contained notions of spirituality, religion, or faith…”
(Orsi 1985: xviii).3
The sanitized language of bhakti, karma, and dharma in
Gyanendra’s billboards conflated religious performance
with political practice. Incorporating a generalized form of
a universal Nepali Hinduism, it suggested the “regimen of
orthodox practices” required for the residents of a modern
nation-state. The “sanitized” Hinduism promoted in these
boards targeted the urban middle class citizens of Kathmandu, an educated and upwardly mobile demographic
concerned with “the material and ‘realist’ logics” (Liechty
2003: 182) that comprise the socio-economics (free-market
economy), politics (multiparty representative democracy),
and identity (neoliberal self) widely envisioned in the new
Nepal (Kunreuther 2010). Though not necessarily reflective of diverse local realities, specifically those outside
Kathmandu, this language possessed the potential to fill
the relative void left by the weakening of specifically
Hindu religious elements formerly associated with Nepal’s
constitution and monarchy. These elements include the
ban on cow slaughter and on proselytizing; the promotion
of Hindu religious festivals, religious discourses, caste
hierarchy, and Sanskrit education; and the Hindu monarchy itself (Sharma 2002: 22). As these billboards prescribed,
Nepali people, now citizens of equal standing in a modern
nation-state rather than subservient and stratified subjects
of a medieval monarchy, might fulfill their quasi-religious
duty through their support of human rights, of the Nepali
state and its security forces, and of the nation’s modernization and development.
Rather than focusing on the bottom-up rhetorical and performative tactics that form the core of studies on Maoist
rebels, political parties, and informal institutions in contemporary Nepal, this essay contributes to ongoing conversations about political power, language, and media by
exploring the royal Nepali government’s attempt to deploy
this type of religiosity from the top down. Seira Tamang’s
critique of “the imposition of explanatory categories from
above” applies well here, as these billboards reproduce the
“disempowering manner in which ostensibly ‘democratizing’ principles or objectives are actually wielded in Nepal”
(Tamang 2002: 315-316). Thus, despite references to development and modernity, the religious language contained
in Gyanendra’s billboards continued to support the exclu-
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sion that had been enshrined in the ‘old Nepal,’ especially
in King Mahendra’s 1962 Panchayat Constitution, which
established Nepal as a ‘Hindu kingdom.’ This continuity
with Nepal’s past contributed to the ultimate rejection of
these boards fifteen months later amidst the April 2006 jan
andolan, the nationwide movement during which tens of
thousands of Nepalis protested the king’s autocratic grasp
at power. Widely vandalized by the Nepali public, these
boards, ultimately removed by the Nepali government,
signaled the rejection of Gyanendra’s vision of the nation
described within these boards.
This essay will be divided into three sections, each of
which will contain an epigraph that, bearing the content
of one of the billboards, will introduce the content of
that section. The first section will introduce the form and
content of the billboards, the socio-political context of
the new Nepal in which they were raised, and the middle
class audience to which they were directed; the second
section will detail the content of the religious billboards;
and the concluding section will address the role of religion
in the ‘new Nepal’ and will reflect on th e rejection of the
billboards within the larger setting of the iconoclasm seen
through-out the second jan andolan.
Modern, Middle Class Billboards
“Fruitful democracy is the true ‘people’s doctrine.’”
saphal prajātantra nai
sakkalī janavād ho
– Billboard on Kathmandu’s Kantipath Road, attributed to Śrī 5 Gyānendra
In his work on middle class modernity in Kathmandu,
Mark Liechty establishes the middle class of Nepal’s largest
city and capital as not significantly different from middle
class populations anywhere in the developed or developing
world. Like the new Nepal itself, middle classness is not a
status to be attained once and for all, but a fluid social process; relative to the “large population of urban poor” below
and the “small transnational elite” above, the middle class
is “a constantly renegotiated cultural space . . . in which
the terms of inclusion and exclusion are endlessly tested,
negotiated, and affirmed” (Liechty 2003: 4, 16). Members
of the aspiring middle class perform this negotiation of inclusion and exclusion through a variety of related means:
their consumption rather than production of commodities;
their rhetorical emphasis on honor, personal achievement,
and responsibility that transcends traditional vocabularies;
and their use of “local caste logics and other religiously
based notions of propriety and suitability that, in turn,

Figure 1. “Fruitful democracy is the
true ‘people’s doctrine.’”
(Michael Baltutis, 2006)

shape middleclass discourses of honor and prestige”
(Liechty 2003: 14, 20). All of these practices and many more
work to ground such values as “the material and ‘realist’
logics of consumerism, labor, democracy, freedom, individual achievement, and responsibility” (Liechty 2003: 182).
The form and content of these royal billboards supported
this middle-class modernity by consistently referencing
these negotiated characteristics and of the active role that
their audience was to take in the construction of new Nepal. Each sign contained a message in formal Sanskritized
Nepali, around which was placed a set of emblems and
phrases identifying its royal source.4 The lower left-hand
corner of each board was marked with the name of the
governmental agency responsible for its publication, Śrī 5
ko Sarkār Sūcnā Vibhāg (the Royal Government’s Department of Information). On either the far left or far right of
each sign was an oval containing an emblem of either the
royal crown or the flag of Nepal. Finally, the lower-right
hand corner contained the name of the royal figure to
whom the message was attributed; in most cases this is
either Śrī 5 Gyānendra or Sva. Śrī 5 Bīrendra.5 Immediately
following Gyanedra’s 2006 reinstatement of Parliament,
these phrases acknowledging royal authorship were routinely covered over or erased, the public’s most consistent
method of defacing the billboards (Ranjitkar 2009).
Gyanendra was not the first to use the medium of the
billboard for the dissemination of political information.

The same form was used by Gyanendra’s father, King
Mahendra, in the relatively media-free society of late
nineteen sixties Nepal, to communicate “propaganda and
publicity emphasizing the traditional role of the monarch
as a symbol of national unity and as a centre of loyalty for
various ethnic groups” (Shah 1990: 7).6 Though the content
of Mahendra’s messages has not, to my knowledge, been
preserved in any systematic way, several fragments do
exist. Fran Hosken provides one example in her 1974 photographic survey of changing life in the Kathmandu Valley:
a family-planning poster from the city of Patan that shows
a family of four (mother, father, son, and daughter) with
the slogan “Sano parivar, sukhi parivar” (“A small family is
a happy family”) (Hosken 1974: 285). The main characters
in Samrat Upadhyay’s 2006 novel The Royal Ghosts reflect
on the rather insipid content of this first generation of
royal billboard. When Rumila advises Suresh to “focus on
the present and the future” rather than on the past, Suresh
jokes that “she sounded like the so-called Supreme Pronouncements of the kings that were scrawled on billboards
across the city: ‘Use your hands, not your mouth, to build
your country.’ ‘Our Nation, Culture, King—dearer than
our own life.’” Rumila responds that her favorite billboard
was “the one in English that exhorted drivers to be Better
Late Than Never—and this in a country where most people
barely knew English” (Upadhyay 2006: 83-84). The use of
such messages in Upadhyay’s novel reflects upon the relative absence of non-sanctioned forms of public communi-
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cation in Mahendra’s Panchayat-era Nepal, as well as the
mild amusement with which his billboards were received
(Baltutis 2011: 194). Gyanendra’s billboards not only hearkened back to the time of his father when the few media
outlets in landlocked Nepal were legally prohibited from
challenging the king and his government, but they also
visually reinforced his own 2005 ban on all international
communication, leaving these boards—at least in theory—as the only messages in town (Onta 2006: 1, 123). Thus,
despite their promise of the “beginning of a new era,” as
one billboard proclaimed, Gyanendra’s messages, in both
their form and content, maintained a striking continuity
with Nepal’s past (Bhattarai 2007).
The content of the 149 billboards can roughly be grouped
into seven themes, all of which dovetail with the characteristics described by Liechty above. Multiple boards refer
to human rights, opposition to terrorism, civic responsibility, royal responsibility, development and modernization
(Nep. bikās), integration into a larger world, and multiparty
democracy (Baltutis 2011: 196-7). The board quoted in the
epigraph to this section and depicted in Figure 1 deals
with the broader issue of inclusion that grounds middle
class aspirations. The message on this board, “Fruitful
democracy is the true ‘people’s doctrine,’” substitutes a
much more common term for “democracy,” prajātantra,
for janavād, which I have translated here more literally as
the ‘people’s doctrine.’7 This message obliquely refers to
the major political issue of the day, the ongoing conflict
with Maoist rebels, by playing both on the Maoist designation of the “People’s War” (janayuddh), the civil war
begun in 1996, and on the name of the socialist philosophy
of Maoism itself (māovād). Using a word that juxtaposes
the key elements of these two terms (jana- and -vād), the
royal government stated its preferences for the future
direction of the country by asserting that responsible
citizens of Kathmandu, rather than the Maoists who had
been grabbing many of the headlines, had a significant and
even the “true” (sakkalī) role to play in the future direction
of the country.8 This theme of the opposition between the
respectable citizens of Kathmandu and the Maoist rebels
permeates the entire set of billboards. I believe this is purposeful and intended to collapse any distinction between
citizen, student leader, and democratic party member,
thus making all non-Maoists ‘suitable’ to assist in the
construction of the new Nepal.9 Furthermore, the boards
place this opposition in transhistorical rhetoric lauding
the proper attitudes and responsibilities of the citizens of a
“Hindu and Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom,” whose
sovereignty is constitutionally “vested in the Nepalese
people” (Article 1.3).
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Though equal in size and prominence to advertising billboards, these political billboards remained in situ for over
a year, rather than undergoing the typical rotation of “gigantic effigies of consumption every two to three months”
(Note 2007: 138). The general dissatisfaction that resulted
in the removal of these signs is rooted, in part, in the
uncomfortable relationship they had to the commercial
signs with which they vied for public attention. On the one
hand, Gyanendra’s billboards possessed an eerie stability
in an economic milieu that requires the constant rotation
of new commercial goods and the means by which they
are advertised to consumers, while on the other hand they
projected a particular vision of the future all too similar
to that advertised on billboards for beauty products, beer,
motorcycles, etc. In line with middle class desires for material wealth and status, it was the job of these billboards,
overlooking some of the busiest roads in the country, to
reform Nepal’s citizens and imbue them with a version of
modernity more amenable to a twenty-first century Nepal,
though one that would anachronistically retain the king
as the nation’s leader (Baltutis 2011: 195). As I will argue
below, the religious billboards in particular performed this
same work as they translated the duties of Nepali citizens
from political to religious language.
Religious Billboards
“All those who love the motherland should commit
as one to making patriotism (deśbhakti) our meeting
point.”
mātṛbhūmilāī māyā garne
sabaile deśbhaktiko milanbindumā
aikyabaddha hune praṇ garauṁ
– Billboard on Kathmandu’s Kantipath Road, attributed to Śrī 5 Gyānendra
The religious language on Gyanendra’s state-sponsored
billboards avoided reference to any specific religious actions (e.g., the performance of a particular ritual). Rather,
references to concepts such as bhakti, karma, and dharma
remained general but recognizable as religious and supported the royal vision of a new Nepal that would be unified
by its acceptance of what Orsi refers to as the “sanitized,
carefully bounded and contained” vocabulary of a “middle
class religiosity” that would transcend sectarianism and
promote inclusion (Orsi 1985: xviii) . Thus, rather than
constituting a “state-sponsored Hinduism,” as Basu frames
the sometimes intimate relationship between Hinduism
and royal politics in Nepal (2010: 111), these billboards
promoted the socio-economic and political processes seen
to be required for the building of the new Nepal. In these

processes, citizens are to actively exercise civic responsibility through their collective support of a democratic
monarchy. Thus, one board quoting King Birendra read:
“The Nepali crown is for the people, the Nepali people are
for the crown, and the king and people are together for
Nepal and for [all things] Nepali.”10
Several recent studies have dealt with South Asian examples of this religious mode, wherein members of a mobile
middle class, those tenuously hanging “between the high
and the low” (Liechty 2003: 61), negotiate their own terms
of inclusion and exclusion through religious media. Examples of this include the construction of goddess temples
in contemporary Chennai, the publication of comic books
and their consumption in the Hindu diaspora, and the
commodification of Hindu pūjā (worship) items in Singapore (Waghorne 2001; McLain 2009; Sinha 2011). Philip
Lutgendorf provides another such example in his interpretation of the rise of the iconography of and devotion
to the powerful pañcha-mukhī (five-faced) Hanumān; this
“tantrified” deity is a means whereby, “In a Kali Yuga of
spiraling consumerism, corruption, and inflation, middle-class worshipers … desire the ‘quick fix’ of Tantra but
within the context of the respectable Vaishnava piety long
advocated by prosperous mercantile groups” (Lutgendorf
2001: 288). Associated with both Śiva and Vishnu, Hanumān possesses a “reverence for dharma [that] is beyond
question,” as he blends Śiva’s “raw and edgy energy with
an adamantine yogic calm and a Vaisnavized emotional
flux. He is, as his devotees often remark with satisfaction,
the embodiment of both śakti and bhakti…” (Lutgendorf
2001: 288). The negotiation of opposing poles of religiosity
displayed throughout this scholarship—powerful śakti with
devotional bhakti, and a traditional rural hinterland with
devotees’ modern urban lives—reflects the tenuousness of
contemporary middle class Hindu South Asia, as its citizens
continually negotiate issues of inclusion and exclusion.
The inclusion typically inherent in this middle-class
Hinduism tends to be filtered, regardless of the deity
central to any particular practice, through a process of
Vaishnavization. Meant to assist in the upward mobility of
a community, this devotion to a form or characteristic of
Vishnu serves several related functions. On the one hand,
it emphasizes an orderly social process, seen in Vishnu’s
periodic rescue of the world from chaos in the form of one
of his avatars. It also uses the broad concepts of dharma and
bhakti to negotiate classical and contemporary forms of
social organization. Further, it promotes a devotion to “respectable” patterns of social behavior, including vegetarianism (Hawley 2001: 220). Though Gyanendra’s billboards
eschew both the more politically conservative components

of Vaishnavization in India (e.g. Hindutvā and Rām rājya in
the wake of the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya) and the popular conception of the Nepali king as a
form of Vishnu, his focus on bhakti, karma, and dharma participates in the broader Vaishnavization process described
by these authors. The functions of this Hindu rhetoric are
similar to those of the theistic identifications that Stephanie Tawa Lama notes in her study of political representations of the Goddess in India. In order to legitimize
people’s participation in political movements, she argues,
politicians: 1. recast an ongoing struggle in familiar terms,
2. draw on the emotional appeal of voters and citizens, 3.
translate a political endeavor into a religious mission, and
4. simplify the fight as one of good against evil (Lama 2001:
7-8). Despite the absence of any rhetoric proclaiming the
king’s popular identity as Vishnu during the first (1990) or
second (2006) jan andolan, these four related functions were
clearly operative in Gyanendra’s billboards.
In the sign that stands as the epigraph to this section, “All
those who love the motherland should commit as one to
making patriotism (deśbhakti) our meeting point,” Gyanendra utilizes the Hindu devotional term bhakti for explicitly
political purposes. The compound word deśbhakti represents the standard Nepali word for ‘patriotism’ that had
been enshrined in the 1962 Constitution: “Devotion to the
Nation and loyalty to the State are the fundamental duties
of every citizen” (Part 3.9.1). The significance of the Department of Information’s use of this word within the larger context of the billboards goes beyond simple patriotism,
however. Appearing on multiple billboards, the term bhakti
represents one of the standard and most flexible mode
of middle class religiosity in contemporary South Asia.11
Moreover, bhakti is often connected to a specifically Vaishnava vocabulary that, as Burghart argues, Nepali royalty
had long used “in translating the values and ideals of the
modern nation-state into the Nepali political arena as well
as in defining the legitimate and illegitimate commitment
of Nepalese citizens to their state” (1984: 120).
In service of his project of nation building, Gyanendra
employed a version of Mahendra’s deśbhakti from the nineteen sixties, thus recalling the latter’s official references
to ‘devotion.’ Applying “service to one’s redeeming deity”
to deś sevā (service to the nation), Mahendra, Richard
Burghart argues, had further encouraged deś banāune (nation building), deś nirmāṇa (nation construction), and deś
vikās (national development). Along these lines, Gyanendra
featured a phrase attributed to Mahendra in one of his other billboards as he used his father’s deś-centered language:
“The goal of democracy is not simply democracy. Rather,
its goal is the construction of the nation (deś nirmāṇa)
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Figure 2. “Exerting great effort,
do good work. Action (karma) is
superior to inaction (akarma).”
(Michael Baltutis, 2006)

and of its people” (Burghart 1984: 120). In response to the
Western concept of equality, Burghart argues, Mahendra further employed the devotional concept of identity
(samān), thus identifying the citizens of Nepal as devotees
of Vishnu who possess “an identical subtle substance that
unites them within the subtle body of Vishnu in the form
of Parbrahma” (Burghart 1984: 120).
Despite the absence of any such overt Vaishnavism in Gyanendra’s rhetoric—he included no language that explicitly
connected himself or his citizens to the god Vishnu—his
message still picks up on both the intimacy and inclusion
often involved in bhakti rhetoric. The ‘love’ (māyā) in the
board’s opening phrase recalls, for example, the emotional
longing for Krishna of which the sixteenth century sant
poet Mīrabāī sang in her devotional poetry (Lorenzen 2004:
207). The ‘unity’ (aikyabaddha) in the latter part is a representative component of avarṇadharmī bhakti, a devotionalism that “actively opposed the traditional Hindu social
and religious ideology of the caste system and patriarchal
dominance;” practitioners of this form of bhakti often utilize techniques of interior mysticism that “[imply] that all
human beings are equally grounded in divine reality, [and]
it is often associated with a more egalitarian social ideology” (Lorenzen 2004: 203, 209). The “orderly social process”
that Hawley identifies as one of the characteristics of
Vaishnavism takes form here as a stable and permanent
inclusion that, though sidestepping Mahendra’s “devotional concept of identity” (samān) contributes to a collective
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devotion to the nation. This idealized stability stands in
opposition to the real instability of both urban middle
classness in Kathmandu and the opposition that these billboards created between the imagined community of “those
who love the motherland” and the Maoist rebels, a dichotomy that permeates this entire set of royal messages.
A second sign reinforces this sense of religious affect
doubling as democratic responsibility: “Exerting great
effort, do good work. Action (karma) is superior to inaction
(akarma)” (Figure 2).13 The concept of karma, one of the
most fundamental among Indic religions, is “the ‘doctrine’
or ‘law’ that ties actions to results and creates a determinant link between an individual’s status in this life and his
or her fate in future lives” (Tull 2004: 309). In the closest
example of “theistic identification” in all of these boards,
it is Bhagavān Śrī Kṛṣna, the Hindu deity Krishna, and not
Gyanendra or any other past Nepali king, who occupies
the lower-right corner of the sign where the author of the
message is identified. Its message, a Nepali translation of a
passage from the Bhagavad Gītā (3.8a) represents a key moment in the text when Krishna encourages his compatriot,
the warrior Arjuna, to perform his proper duty, his dharma.
The context of this billboard, a decade-long civil war with
the Maoist rebels, reflects that of the Gītā, a lecture given
by Krishna in the midst of a civil war in which Arjuna does
not wish to fight against his friends, relatives, and teachers
but whose doubts are repeatedly assailed by Krishna’s own
recourse to the terminology of bhakti, karma, and dharma.

Figure 3. “As the country belongs to all,
our dharma is to carry out our obligations
[towards it].”
(Michael Baltutis, 2006)

This metaphor of battle was not lost, I presume, on the
Department of Information as they worked to unite Nepal’s
people against the Maoists and sought to support a janavād
rather than a janayuddh.
The Sanskrit verbal root (kṛ) upon which the Indic word
karma (‘action’) is based reinforces the active role of Kathmandu’s citizens in yet other boards. One sign, attributed
to no particular author, reads: “Direct or indirect support
to terrorists is a punishable crime. Rather than enduring
terrorism, we should oppose the doctrine of terrorism,
and we should provide assistance to those who offer
protection.”14 Though never directly named in these signs,
Maoist rebels appear here in the guise of the ātaṇkakārī,
‘terrorists.’ The dichotomy between Kathmandu’s citizens
and the Maoist rebels that is implied throughout these
billboards is made explicit here, with this verbal root
providing the suffix for the two opposing sides: citizens
should provide assistance not to the ātaṇkakārī (‘those who
perform acts of violence’) but rather to the surakṣākarmī
(‘those who offer protection’), the latter referring to the
police and army, the agents of state power. Moreover, this
sign’s reference to ātaṇkavād, the ‘doctrine of terrorism,’
further dichotomizes the peaceful actions of Kathmandu’s
citizens, grounded in the ‘people’s doctrine’ of janavād, to
the destructive actions of the Maoist rebels. Krishna’s reference to karma in the Gītā reflects not simply the spiritual

conflict that takes place on the “battlefield of dharma,”
as the Gītā’s opening verse states, but also to the action of
engaging in a difficult struggle or even a military conflict.
More than simply working to win the battle, however,
Arjuna’s karma, like that of the citizens of Kathmandu, will
restore the world to its proper cosmic order, echoing the
Vaishnavization process mentioned above.
A third sign, attributed to King Mahendra, uses the concept of dharma to speak to the responsibility that citizens
of Nepal have towards their democratizing nation: “As the
country belongs to all, our dharma is to carry out our obligations [towards it]” (Figure 3).15 The concept of dharma—
variously translated as law, order, or duty—is, like karma,
one of the most fundamental and flexible concepts among
South Asian religions, and it is this issue that Krishna and
Arjuna negotiate as they debate the proper action (karma)
that Arjuna is to perform on the battlefield. Hindu dharma
texts from the turn of the Common Era prescribe dharma
in myriad ways, dealing with everything from the proper
activities of a renouncer, to the proper methods of domestic worship, to the proper roles of women. In other words,
dharma is an open signifier that may be filled with virtually
any type of proper conduct. Despite this flexibility, Barbara
Holdrege reminds us of its real-world applications: “In its
normative dimension, dharma, the cosmic ordering principle, finds expression on the human plane in the ritual,
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social, and moral orders…” (Holdrege 2006: 214). In this
case, we might easily add ‘political’ to Holdrege’s list to
categorize the responsibility that the Nepali government is
encouraging in its citizens, as it uses dharma to translate “a
political endeavor into a religious mission” (Lama 2001: 8).
In summary, the use of bhakti, karma, and dharma contributed to, frequently overlapped with, and reinforced
the more prosaic and political conceptions of nationality,
democracy, and livelihood in contemporary Nepal. Such
messages simplified the fight as one between the urban
middle class of Kathmandu and the Maoist rebels, thereby
reproducing values that are part and parcel of the new Nepal (human rights, development, integration into a modern
globalized world, etc.). The messages did this even as the
Hindu language inscribed on these boards reinforced the
Shah dynasty’s long history of religiously and ethnically
exclusionary policies and the “Hindu and Constitutional
Monarchical Kingdom” enshrined in the 1990 Constitution.
Though referring to a middle class sense of responsibility
and though using concrete and recognizable religious language, these billboards did not communicate any specific
activity that citizens were enjoined to perform. Rather,
they stopped short at merely redirecting the impetus
behind traditional devotional performances—temple
worship, neighborhood processions, and communal singing—towards political actions performed by the nation’s
bhaktas, those patriots who are unified in their shared
attitudes and practices towards the process of constructing
the new Nepal. But, the absence of the theological identity
between the Nepali king and Vishnu undercut the possibility of a religio-political identity between king and citizen, as
Burghart had argued had been the case in King Mahendra’s
time. This ambiguity of political identity highlighted the
absence of any detailed directive for citizen activity and
thus rendered these billboards mere political slogans; the
responsibility for performing political karma—facilitating
development, upholding human rights, and responding to
terrorism—then became, especially within the context of
Gyanendra’s restrictions on civic freedoms, the duty of the
royal government. What remained of the dharma of Nepal’s
citizens was simply a sense of (deś)bhakti, of devotion (to
the nation), though the inability to know and actively perform one’s duty created the opportunity not just for the
active participation in a new Nepal but also for the active
rejection of these billboards, of Gyanendra’s February First
project, and of the Nepali monarchy itself.
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Rejecting the Billboards, Building a New Nepal
“All Nepali people must decide in their own minds
on their roles and responsibilities towards their
nation.”
pratyek nepālīle āphno man mastiṣkmā rāṣtrīyaprati āphno pani kehī dāyitva ra kartavya cha bhanne
bhāvnā rākhnu pardcha |
Billboard on Kathmandu’s Kantipath Road
– attributed to Śrī 5 Gyānendra
A news article on the deteriorating political situation in
Nepal following 1 February 2005, published by the humanitarian news service IRIN Asia, asserted that Amnesty
International and other human rights organizations were
encouraging sanctions against the Nepali government in
order to encourage the resumption of democratic freedoms. The photo at the top of this article depicts one of
the few English language billboards installed in the city:
“Only a meaningful multyparty [sic] democracy can be an
effective means of governance by the people.” IRIN’s caption conveys the general response with which these boards
were met: “Many have grown skeptical over promises by
the king, such as this one posted on a billboard outside
the royal palace in Kathmandu” (IRIN 2006). A photo in
the English language weekly Nepali Times from April 2006
shows a billboard that has been mangled and pulled halfway off of its steel foundations; its caption reads: “REJECTED SLOGANS: Billboards with famous soundbites of King
Gyanendra after they were toppled by demonstrators on
Tuesday at Ratna Park” (Sharma 2006). Nearly one month
after the photo of the mangled sign was published amidst
widespread graffiti, vandalism, and destruction of many
other signs, and fifteen months after their installation, the
royal government removed all 149 billboards. Department
of Information official Kedar Bhattarai stated, “We have
decided to remove all hoarding boards carrying the king’s
quotations considering people’s vehement dissatisfaction
against the king during the recent democratic uprising”
(AFP). Another unnamed official stated that the signs “gave
a false impression that the king was committed to democracy while running the country, despite arresting opposition leaders and cracking down on the media” (AFP 2006).
Rather than potentially providing immunity from such
acts of destruction, I argue that the overtly religious language in fact contributed to—and almost demanded—their
rejection. This rejection was premised on the presumed
traditional and Hindu notions of exclusion reinforced
therein and their stark contrast to the theme of inclusion
widely associated with the building of a new Nepal. The of-

ficial removal of these boards thus represented not simply
“dissatisfaction against the king” but a more comprehensive rejection of the idea that the leader of a “Hindu and
Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom” possesses the ability
to competently develop the qualities—especially that of
inclusion—required for the desired new Nepal.16
By way of conclusion, I consider three other examples of
state-sponsored spaces, voices, and images from contemporary Nepal. These examples further contextualize Gyanendra’s billboards by presenting similar communicative
and performative techniques, deployed from the top down
and in moments of political crisis, that similarly demanded
the response of Nepal’s citizens.
In her book Reigning the River, Anne Rademacher focuses
on the royal government’s construction of a new (and rapidly built) urban park in the neighborhood of Maitighar.
This park was built in anticipation of a 2001 visit from an
international delegation from the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) that just happened to be
taking place in the wake of that year’s emergency, declared
following the royal massacre and increasing tensions with
Maoist rebels. Interestingly, Rademacher notes that large
public billboards were installed welcoming the SAARC delegates, covering up extant advertising billboards. These official boards, whose messages became the object of literary
satire, “blended almost eerily with their ubiquity … [and]
were ultimately the domain of the state” (Rademacher
2011: 205). Equally, the “domain of the state” was the focal
point of Rademacher’s analysis, a stone and iron mandala
placed as the centerpiece of the Maitighar Park. Reading
this object as “a restatement of the centrality of Kathmandu, the national capital and the seat of a still-reigning monarch, in a larger Nepal gripped by revolutionary
violence,” Rademacher argues that the mandala was “an
iconic symbol of the relationship between the monarch
and the national project [that] transformed Maitighar
into a spatial rendering of nationhood at a time when the
kingship was under undeniable strain” (Rademacher 2011:
122, 123). Though not destroyed outright, the Maitighar
mandala provided a similar focus of public protest, as did
the billboards at the core of my analysis, erected some five
years later. Though difficult to access to by foot, the park
served as host to hundreds of groups protesting the royal
government and rallying in favor of a “democratic, new
Nepal” (Rademacher 2011: 135).
In her work on the language used on FM radio programs
in Nepal, Laura Kunreuther contrasts sīdhā with ghumāune
kurā—the “direct voice” of the personal conversations on
FM radio with the “talk that goes around” in more official

media outlets. Kunreuther asserts that listeners and callers
to these programs are able to use this direct (sīdhā) voice
as a means not only to give voice to personal and cultural
issues they may feel to be too difficult to discuss at home
but also to provide “a means of effecting social change,”
as this direct speech is “semantically linked to symbols
of a new democratic moment, particularly transparency
of governance and ‘free speech’” (Kunreuther 2010: 341,
344). The end product of this discursive process—brought
about by this directness and by the social change and
democracy preliminarily effected—is the development of
the neoliberal self, Kunreuther asserts, “one in which the
voice and interiority figures centrally as the critical means
to reform oneself and society more broadly” (Kunreuther
2010: 342, 346). State-run Radio Nepal is the polar opposite
of these FM radio programs and has long been a primary
source of ghumāune kurā. Kunreuther repeatedly returns to
this counter example, noting that the typically male voice
of the Radio Nepal announcer is “regulated” and “monotone,” its cadence lacks spontaneity and connecting phatic
language, and its use of Sanskritic phrases “evokes an image of highcaste civil servants whose words echo with the
sound of the state” and whose words “do not mean what
they say” (Kunreuther 2010: 336-345).17
Finally, Gérard Toffin’s study of ritual power in modern
Nepal shows more clearly how the religious content of the
billboards at the heart of my study was part of their undoing. Toffin argues that “royal images and ceremonies…
can be seen as a constructed performance displaying signs
of authority and delivering a visual message” (Toffin 2008:
146). He sets this assertion against the backdrop of the
iconoclastic period (2003-2007) that overlapped with the
second jan andolan. During this period, dozens of statues
of Nepali kings were vandalized, demolished, or blown up,
without attention to the identity of the king depicted or of
his role in working towards constructing a more democratic Nepal (Toffin 2008: 171). Each statue was taken to
be a representation of the royal family, and the removal
of each and every statue, “the destruction of the old order
and its symbols,” was required for “making a new Nepal”
(Toffin 2008: 172). Though Toffin asserts that the organization of this royal iconoclasm was largely Maoist-led, the
activity and the logic behind it was much more universal.
The annexation of the Newar territory of the Kathmandu
Valley in the eighteenth century by Gorkha armies and the
forcible Hinduization of Tibeto-Burmese-speaking ethnic
minorities by more recent Shah kings served as the impetus behind these destructive acts (Toffin 2008: 171). Thus,
rather than identifying individuals or groups responsible
for the destruction of these royal icons or, in my case, of
the state-sponsored billboards, it is this “impetus” within
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the “iconoclastic period” that encouraged the myriad examples of vandalism and that resulted in “the destruction
of the old order and its symbols.”
The targets of this iconoclasm are, more generally, those
edicts and objects that represent specifically Hindu forms
of exclusion that have been enacted through official
strategies of royal power. Examples of such strategies
of Hinduization include the construction of myths and
legends about royal families in Sanskrit Vaṁśāvalī texts,
the publication of the caste-based Muluki Ain (National Law
Codes) in 1854, the drafting of multiple Nepali constitutions that assert the nation’s Hindu identity, and regular
public ritual performances of collective allegiance to a king
who maintains associations to the Hindu gods Indra and
Vishnu. Much of the scholarship on such public displays
by the Nepali state has focused on its conservative function. Subho Basu asserts, “The quasi-feudal monarchical
regime used religion to establish its hegemonic ideological
presence in the political landscape” (Basu 2010: 112), and
other scholars have written of these displays as elements
of official propaganda that “propagate,” “promote,”
“create,” “legitimize,” “foster,” and “enable” the state.18
I am considering Gyanendra’s billboards here in a less
functional manner, as a means by which the royal Nepali
government, at a time of considerable stress, attempted to
publicly reconceive the nature of the monarchy and of the
relationship of the state with its people and with the wider
world, while using a recognizable religious rhetoric and a
popular form of media, the billboard, to do so.
The value that these boards possessed was not, I argue, in
their ability to “gather spontaneous consent of the subject
population to his rule” as Basu asserts (2010: 111). Rather
than somehow duping Nepal’s citizens into reaffirming a
long-lost faith in the royal government, their potential value was rather in their framing as religious narrative. Had
the signs achieved their intended effect, they would have
done so by using the universal Hindu language of karma,
dharma, and bhakti. Such language would construct a new
Nepal more compatible with a continuation of the royal
government: a Hindu polity with a mythological dharmic
past as well as a modern nation state comprised of devoted
and active citizens, with both ruled by a benevolent and
democratic monarchy. The hope was that such mutuality
of form and content could allow the royal government
to discursively display to the urbanizing residents of the
Kathmandu Valley the social, political, economic, and religious values to which they had already been exposed and
with which they had already begun to negotiate. In doing
so, the creators of these billboards aspired to align the
monarchy with this new democratic and capitalist spirit
glossed in a transhistorical Hindu vocabulary.
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Unfortunately for the royal government, the Hindu
religiosity enshrined in these billboards carried with it
the exclusivity that typified the ‘old Nepal.’ The form and
content of the boards too closely resembled the regulated
and monotone language associated with other forms of
official discourse whose words were perceived to not mean
what they say: the Maitighar park that was the “domain
of the state,” Radio Nepal that carries the “sound of the
state,” and the vandalized royal images that displayed the
“old order and its symbols.” Though the presence of these
billboards—representing a fifteen-month snapshot in the
history of Nepal when the downfall of the Shah dynasty
was nearly inevitable—was meant to ground the idealized attitudes and responsibilities of the citizens in King
Gyanendra’s vision of the new Nepal, the ensuing iconoclasm directed against them represented a rejection of this
same vision: though appearing to be built upon the values
of “democracy, freedom, individual achievement, and
responsibility,” the rejected Hindu and subtly Vaishnava
religious idiom upon which this vision was built served as
a visual reminder, rather, of the continuity between king,
country, and religion that was part and parcel of the ‘old
Nepal’ enshrined in previous constitutions and implied
throughout this entire set of royal billboards.
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Endnotes
1. Though this term became used much more frequently
in the wake of the end of the Nepali monarchy, it had been
used since at least 2003 (cf. Acharya 2003).
2. It is to this long-running criticism that Gyanendra
appears to respond in one of his billboards: “Local culture
is to be recognized as the civilizing elements and as
the treasures of any nation’s incalculable wealth” (Lok
saṁskṛti nai kunai pani rāṣtrako bahumūlya sampattikā
sāthai sabhyatā ra sampannatāko pahicān ho).
3. See Sijapati 2013 for the ways that Muslims in
Kathmandu negotiated their identities within a Hindu
kingdom.
4. The use of formal Nepali is evident even in the first
sign listed above, as the Sanskritized “nava Nepāl” is used
instead of the more colloquial “nayā Nepāl.”
5. The Nepali ‘Śrī 5’ [shrī pāṇch] has no direct English
language equivalent, but refers to the ‘fifth-level
glorification’ that was originally bestowed upon the Shah
kings during the Rana period (1846–1951). The “Sva.” that
precedes the name of King Birendra refers to his status as
svargavāsī, “residing in heaven.”
6. See Burghart 2001 and Malagodi 2013 (89-93, 94-97) on
the public use of religious rhetoric by King Mahendra.
7. One dictionary defines this term as: “a political
principle in which the supreme administrator must be
elected by common people” (Krämer 2007: 60).
8. Another board, quoting King Tribhuvan, reads:
“In democracy, citizens possess a great responsibility
prajātantra mā nāgarik ko ṭhulo dāyitva huncha |.

9. Personal communication, Dina Bangdel and Ramesh
Parajuli.
10. nepālī rājmukuṭ prajāko nimti, nepālī prajā rājmukuṭ
ko nimitta, rājā ra prajā dubai nepāl ra nepālīko nimti.
11. Another billboard read: “In the interest of patriotism
(deśbhakti) and in the interest of the welfare of the nation
and its people, all conflicts should be put to rest, and all
solutions based on mutual ill-feeling must be eliminated”
(pratyek vivādlāī deśbhaktiko ādhārmā suljhāī apsī
manomālinyalāī deś ra janatāko hitko ādhārmā ṭuṅgyāune
pardcha).
12. prajātantra prajātantra ko nimitta nabhaī janatāko ra
deś nirmā ko nimti ho.
13. prayatnaśīla bhaera khub kām gara, akarma bhandā
ta karma nai śreṣṭha huncha |. The Sanskrit of the Gītā
(3.8a) reads: niyatam kuru karma tvam karma jyāyo hy
akarmana.
14. ātaṅkakārīlāī pratyakṣa vā apratyakṣa sayahog garnu
daṇḍanīya aparādh ho | ātaṅk sahanu bhandā āta
ṅkabādko birodh garauṁ, surakṣākarmīlāī sahayog
garauṁ | .
15. deś sabaiko sājā ho, kartavyamā lāgnu nai hāmro
dharma ho.
16. The Constitution of 1990 stated that “Nepal is a
multiethnic, multilingual, democratic, independent,
indivisible, sovereign, Hindu and Constitutional
Monarchical Kingdom,” but the Interim Constitution of
2007 eliminated all references to religion, asserting, “Nepal
is an independent, indivisible, sovereign, secular, inclusive
and a fully democratic State” (Article 1.4.1).
17. John Whelpton similarly asserts the
counterproductivity of the formal language of Radio
Nepal broadcasts, where “many villagers cannot have
fully understood what was being said, while for more
sophisticated listeners the propagandist nature of the
broadcasts was so obvious as to be frequently counterproductive” (Whelpton 2005: 170).
18. Ostrowski 2006: 14; Hangen 2007: 11-12; Basu 2010:
111.
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